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PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 
THE REIGN OF ERROR: PSYCHIATRY, AUTHORITY, AND LAW. By Lee 
Coleman, M.D. Boston, Beacon Press 1984. 300 Pp., $18.95. 
Reviewed by Linda C. Fentiman * 
The Reign of Error is psychiatrist Lee Coleman's indictment of 
the abuses of psychiatry, both ancient and modern. Coleman canvasses 
a variety of topics in the area of psychiatry and the law, including 
the insanity defense, diminished capacity, competency to stand trial, 
involuntary civil commitment and treatment of the mentally ill, in- 
determinate sentencing of criminals, and the juvenile justice system. 
Coleman's book, published in 1984, is a highly readable but seriously 
flawed effort to address the misuses of psychiatry and its employment 
by the state as an instrument of social control. 
The Reign of Error suffers from two major defects. First, and 
most significantly, the book is written ten years too late, and describes 
a mental health system that, to a large extent, no longer exists. In 
an innovative twist on the "I've got some good news and some bad 
news" routine, Coleman merely gives us old news: the widely accepted 
view that psychiatry has sometimes been used as an agency of state 
power' to remove deviant people from the community, and that many 
serious violations of liberty and personal integrity have been ac- 
complished in the guise of "benevolent" medical treatment of the 
mentally ill.* From a legal standpoint, the book is particularly de- 
ficient, in that Coleman's apparently limited awareness of significant 
judicial decisions subsequent to the mid-1970's leaves the reader with 
an erroneous view of present law, which has in some respects sig- 
nificantly improved the treatment of the mentally ill in America. 
The book's second major weakness is that it is highly anecdotal 
and impressionistic, with little hard data to back up its emphatic 
conclusions. For example, in support of his argument that psychiatrists 
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1 .  See P.  STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE I5 (1982) "The 
search for legitimation by other agencies in society often promotes dependence upon the 
cultural authority of  medicine. In this regard, medical authority is a resource for social order 
as well as for the profession and its clients." 
2. See A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM (1974); N. KIT- 
TRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT (1971); H .  MORRIS. ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 38-39 (1976); 
A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION (1976); T. S u s z .  PSYCH~ATRIC 
SLAVERY (1 977). 
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often make serious diagnostic and treatment errors, Coleman presents 
a chronicle of abuses which encompasses in its litany of horrors the 
eighteenth century practice of bleeding by Benjamin Rush, "the father 
of American psychiatry," the widespread performance of lobotomies 
in United States mental hospitals during the 1940's and 1950's, and 
the participation of noted psychiatrists in CIA-funded experiments 
with mind-altering drugs during the 1950's and 1960's. While these 
atrocity stories make good copy, they are hardly reflective of the 
state of American psychiatry today. Further, Coleman's emphasis 
on past wrongs has limited his ability to offer constructive solutions 
to the new generation of psychiatric problems presented in the 1980's. 
These weaknesses permeate The Reign of Error. While it is not 
possible to present all of Coleman's errors here, a detailed discussion 
of one of the book's sections-that addressing the treatment and 
mistreatment of the institutionalized mentally ill-will serve as a 
paradigm for the failure of Coleman's analysis throughout the book, 
and will exemplify the limited and outdated case law and data on 
which he relies. 
In addressing the issue of involuntary commitment and treatment 
of the mentally ill, Coleman makes several valid points: that psy- 
chiatrists often "overdiagnose" mental illness; that they sometimes 
institutionalize people not because such commitment is necessary for 
the patient's physical safety or the safety of others, but because it 
is convenient for their family or neighborq3 and that such unwarranted 
institutionalization is effectively a form of preventive detention, a 
systematic deprivation of liberty which is visited upon no other group 
in America today.4 Coleman also notes the substantial body of re- 
search literature which indicates that psychiatrists are simply unable 
to predict, with any kind of accuracy, whether the individuals they 
examine will be "dangerous" to themselves or others in the future, 
and he .therefore argues that they should not be allowed to make 
such predictions in a court of law. '~n i s ,  indeed, was the position 
of the American Psychiatric Association in an amicus curiae brief 
submitted to the Supreme Court in Barefoot v. E~tel le ,~  a case in 
which the Supreme Court upheld the use of psychiatric testimony 
concerning the likelihood that a convicted murderer would commit acts 
of violence in the future, as bearing on the question of whether the 
3. This "convenience function" of the mental health system has been described by Brooks, 
Stone, and others. See sources cited supra note 2. 
4. Dershowitz, Psychiatry in the Legal Process: A Knife That Cuts Both Ways, in A. 
SUTHERLAND, THE PATH OF THE LAW FROM 1967, at 71-83 (1968). 
5 .  103 S. Ct. 3383, 3408-09 (1983). 
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death penalty ought to be imposed. However, in discussing the dan- 
gerousness issue, Coleman fails to mention recent research which, 
while su~porting the general proposition that psychiatrists are in- 
accurate predictors of future dangerousness, also suggests that in 
certain narrowly circumscribed clinical settings, a psychiatrist can 
predict the likelihood of future violent actiom6 It is this sort of 
one-sided presentation of the evidence which permeates the book and 
undercuts the persuasiveness of its analysis. 
Coleman's explication of the other problems of the "civilly" men- 
tally ill is also inadequate. The major foci of his discussion are 
psychiatry's past abuses in treating the mentally ill, the overuse of 
psychotropic medication in the treatment of mental illness, and the 
role of fiscal conservativism in achieving the deinstitutionalization 
of much of the nation's mentally ill population. Here again, Coleman 
paints a misleading and outdated picture of the legal position of the 
mentally ill in America today. 
Characteristically, Coleman begins his attack with a long history 
of past psychiatric abuses (lobotomies and electroconvulsive therapy 
figure prominently here). Having thus set up the reader to be dis- 
trustful of psychiatric hegemony, he warns that, "These lessons from 
the past may be useful should we decide to question the authority 
of today's psychiatrist to have the final say."" 
Coleman next discusses the long-recognized fact that psychotropic 
medication is often prescribed unnecessarily and, even when its use 
is medically appropriate, in excessive dosages. Here, Coleman does 
well to point out that these drugs are often used for the convenience 
of the staff, to make difficult patients easier to control, and that 
in some institutions, medication is used in lieu of psychotherapy, rather 
than as an adjunct to it. Coleman also describes in great detail the very 
serious side effects of psychotropic medication. These painful and 
often permanently disabling side effects, such as tardive dyskinesia, 
are particularly likely to occur when, as was often the case in the 
past, the drugs are prescribed in enormous doses for extended periods 
of time, without careful patient monitoring. Coleman's account of 
psychotropic drugs reads however, as if they serve no useful purpose 
whatsoever and were, indeed, invented solely as instruments of in- 
dividual torture and social control. In fact, psychotropic medication 
is in many cases a necessary predicate to successful psychotherapy, 
and it is psychotropic medication which has made it possible for a 
6. J .  Monahan, Prediction Research and the Emergency Commitment of Dangerous Men- 
tally Ill Persons: A Reconsideration, 135 Am. J .  Psychiatry 198 (1  978). 
7. L. COLEMAN, THE REION OF ERROR 111 (1984). 
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large number of mentally ill individuals to live productively and 
safely in the community. 
Coleman's analysis of the committed mentally ill gives only brief 
attention to the wave of "right to refuse treatment" suits brought 
by institutionalized mental patients in the late 1970 '~ ,~  and fails to 
discuss the results of this litigation. He omits any analysis of the 
differing judicial approaches to the right to treatment and to refuse 
treatment, including the "right to a second psychiatric opinion" 
remedy of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Rennie v. Klei~z,~ 
and the vague and complex "substituted judgment" standards of the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Rogers v. Okin.'O 
More importantly, Coleman fails to acknowledge that an increas- 
ing number of thoughtful commentators have suggested that the real 
concern of most institutionalized mentally ill is not the ability to refuse 
treatment but their inability to get meaningful psychiatric treatment 
in the first place. Since it is only a tiny fraction of all mental pa- 
tients who are asserting a right to refuse treatment," a far more effec- 
tive remedy for all patients would be the court-ordered provision of 
adequate psychiatric services for a11.12 To declare, as Coleman does, 
that a mental patient has an absolute right to refuse treatment under 
all  circumstance^^^ may propel the psychiatrist even more clearly into 
the role of police agent. As explained by Alan Stone, "The refusal 
of treatment makes the confinement of the dangerous mentally ill 
nothing but preventive detention. . . . Confinement without treat- 
ment makes the hospital into a prison and transforms the psychiatric 
staff into correctional officers. " l 4  Surely this result is the antithesis 
of the individual autonomy which Coleman so fervently seeks. 
8. See, e.g., Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1371 (D. Mass. 1979) (patients may 
refuse nonemergency administration of psychotropic drugs); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 
1131, 1147 (D. N.J. 1978) (patients have right to second opinion). 
9. 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981). 
10. 390 Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d 308 (1983). 
11. Professor Alexander Brooks has estimated, for example, that in New Jersey, no more 
than five percent of all state mental patients have ever asserted a right to refuse medication. 
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI SCHOOL OF LAW CONFERENCE ON MENTAL HEALTH LAW: DEVELOPMENTS 
IN THE 1980's (February 24-25, 1984). 
12. This, of course, is not without considerable practical and legal difficulties. Lottman, 
Enforcement of Judicial Decrees: Now Comes the Hard Part, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. RPTR. 
69 (1976); see also Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900, 921 (1984) 
(barring federal court jurisdiction over challenges to  state action based on state law). 
13. "[A]II mental patients [should] be presumed competent to refuse any treatment. Refusal 
should never be overturned by a doctor or a court." L. COLEMAN, THE REIGN OF ERROR 192 
(1984) (emphasis in original). 
14. Stone, The Right to Refuse Treatment: Why Psychiatrisis Should and Can Make it 
Work, 38 .ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 358, 361 (1981). 
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Perhaps most significantly, Coleman fails to address the problems 
of today's mentally ill. Although there are no longer huge numbers 
of mentally ill individuals languishing in the back wards of giant 
state  institution^,'^ there are still a significant number of persons in 
state and local mental health facilities, some of whom are not receiving 
adequate psychiatric treatment, which is the only legitimate justi- 
fication for their involuntary presence there.I6 In addition, there are 
a great number of homeless mentally ill individuals, victims of the 
deinstitutionalization movement of the 1960's and 197OYs, seemingly 
forgotten by Coleman, who are arguably in need of psychiatric treat- 
ment but who do not meet the more stringent civil commitment 
criteria enacted within the past decade. This phenomenon of dein- 
stitutionalization was caused by the convergence of a number of 
factors. In part, it was the result of a series of landmark legal 
victories securing for mental patients significantly increased procedural 
due process piotection,17 narrower criteria for ~omrni t rnent ,~~  and, 
in many jurisdictions, a right to receive such psychiatric treatment 
as gives the patients a meaningful opportunity to be cured or to 
improve their mental condition."19 None of these fundamental changes 
in the treatment accorded the mentally ill are mentioned by Coleman, 
perhaps because they do not fit within his paradigm of psychiatry 
as an instrument of state oppression. But without reference to the 
revolutionary change in both the substantive and procedural aspects 
15. Between 1955 and 1983, the nationwide population of patients at state mental hospitals 
dropped from 559,000 to 132.000. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE REPORT 
ON THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL 62 (H.R. Lamb ed. 1984). 
16. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 455 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. 
Supp. 373, 377 (M.D. Ala. 1972). The significance of these favorable lower court decisions has 
been somewhat undercut by the Supreme Court's decision in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 
U.S. 563 (1975). There the Supreme Court specifically refused to decide the question of whether 
a person civilly committed as mentally ill had a constitutional right to treatment. Id. at 573. 
Instead, the Court held only that the continued confinement, and thus deprivation of liberty, 
of a person who is not dangerous and who could survive in society with the help of others 
was a violation of the right to liberty guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 576. 
For an intriguing analysis of the Court's decision-making process in the Donuldson case, see 
B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT, at 369-89 
(1979). 
17. See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 pmim (E.D. Wis. 1972) (holding civil 
commitment procedures constitutionally defective). 
18. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123 $5 1, 7-8; N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW $5 91.37, 
91.39 (McKinney 1985). 
19. The deinstitutionalization movement also gained momentum due to the financial in- 
ce$tives offered state governments by changes in federal funding for the mentally ill and other 
disabled individuals. However, to  argue, as Coleman does, that deinstitutionalization was 
supported solely for financial reasons is both inaccurate and disingenuous. 
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of civil commitment of the mentally ill over the last two decades, 
the reader is left with a misleading picture of the current status of 
the institutionalized and noninstitutionalized mentally ill. For ex- 
ample, Coleman announces that "in a civil commitment trial, proof 
of accusations [regarding the necessity of commitment] need only 
be shown by a 'preponderance of evidence.' "20 Since the Supreme 
Court's 1979 decision in Addington v.  T e ~ a s , ~ '  however, the standard 
of proof for civil commitment has been the more rigorous "clear 
and convincing evidence" standard. Coleman's failure to mention 
this significant ruling, as well as the decisions of a number of state 
courts which have insisted upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
as a prerequisite for civil ~ommitrnent ,~~ suggest at the very least a 
selective marshalling of the facts, and at most a willful disregard 
for the truth. 
In sum, The Reign of Error is simplistic, polemical, and based 
on inadequate and outmoded data. The subtitle on the book's dust 
jacket makes clear both the thrust of Coleman's argument and also 
its ultimate weakness. The subtitle proclaims the book to be "A 
startling expose of psychiatry's misrule in the courts, mental hospitals, 
and prisons." "Startling" and "expose" seem to be the guiding 
principles of Coleman's endeavor. What is missing in his "National 
Enquirer" approach to the relationship between psychiatry and state 
power is an analysis which recognizes the complexity of the problems 
that confront our society in dealing with the mentally ill today. 
Coleman speaks in moral absolutes, using black and white labels, 
when what is demanded is a thoughtful and reasoned exploration 
of the difficult issues raised when psychiatric expertise is brought 
to bear on the question of individual freedom and responsibility in 
the criminal and civil law. 
20. L. COLEMAN, THE REIGN OF ERROR 108 (1984). 
21. 441 U.S. 418 (1979). 
22. See Superintendent of Worcester State Hosp. v. Hagberg, 374 Mass. 271, 275-76, 372 
N.E.2d 242, 245 (1978). 
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